Follow the Leader? Lead Caravan Driver Can Be Liable for Other Drivers’ Negligence

Yong Tao v. Heng Bin Li (Div. 3, Sept. 18, 2007)

The court of appeals held last week that one driver can be held liable for another driver’s negligence.

The plaintiff was a member of a dance group that made a performance tour of the Northwest in 2001. The group’s director organized the schedule and arranged for the lodging and transportation. For one leg of the tour, the director rented three vans for travel from Spokane to Portland. He drove the lead van and instructed two other drivers to follow in caravan 200 meters apart.

The driver of the second van could not read English, had no map, and had never driven to Portland. He followed the lead driver as instructed. The caravan sped through a severe winter storm on an icy highway, possibly at speeds up to 75 miles per hour. The plaintiff was ejected from the second van when it skidded and flipped over. He sued the drivers of the lead and second van. The trial court granted summary judgment to the lead driver, and the plaintiff appealed.

The court of appeals held that the lead driver owed a duty to the plaintiff and that a jury could find that the second driver was the lead driver’s agent, resulting in vicarious liability, or that the two acted in concert, resulting in joint liability. The case was remanded for trial.

This decision will be cited in future cases involving drivers who caravan or who act illegally together. For example, the court likened the situation to drag racing, which can result in joint liability of the drivers.

Court Revises Voter’s Pamphlet Statement on Referendum 67

The second and likely final round of pre-election court hearings on Referendum 67 was held Friday, August 31.

Having previously challenged the language of the attorney general’s ballot title and measure summary, the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association (WSTLA) challenged the explanatory statement written by the attorney general for the voter’s pamphlet in Thurston County Superior Court. The purpose of the explanatory statement is to describe the law as it presently exists and the effect of the proposed measure if approved. Dana R. Bieber, who filed the Petition for Referendum on the Insurance Fair Conduct Act, which is the subject of Referendum 67, intervened to defend the statement as written. She contended that, if the statement was to be revised, it should mention all of the remedies available to a policyholder under existing law.

Although largely unmoved by WSTLA’s challenge, Judge Ann Hirsch made two noteworthy additions to the explanatory statement. First, the court added a sentence regarding the recoverability of attorney’s fees in insurance coverage disputes under existing law. Second, the court added a reference to the claims-handling regulations that, if violated, can trigger automatic liability under the proposed law. The court rejected WSTLA’s requests to delete a reference to the availability of remedies in addition to actual damages under existing law, to revise the discussion of existing law regarding punitive damages, and to diminish or delete discussion of the exemption of most health insurance from the proposed law. Click here to see the explanatory statement as revised by the court.

WSTLA was represented by Philip A. Talmadge of Talmadge Law Group PLLC. The secretary of state was represented by deputy solicitor general James K. Pharris. The referendum petitioner was represented by Timothy J. Parker and Jason W. Anderson of Carney Badley Spellman PS.